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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

This research memorandum examines the following issue:
How does the concept of freedom of expression limit
prosecutions in the Tribunal for crimes based on expressive
acts?1
The concept of freedom of expression puts few limitations on prosecutions in the
Tribunal for crimes based on expressive acts. The statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR Statute”) enables prosecution for the crimes of direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, and persecutions on political, racial and religious
grounds as a crime against humanity.2 The concept of restricting freedom of expression
in the cases of hate speech, racial propaganda and group defamation is well supported in
international law.3 Several international conventions have provisions for such restrictions

1

See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Office of the Prosecutor, Research Topic No. 1,
Facsimile dated 27 August 2000. The focus of this paper derives from the facsimile which states,
“[s]everal of the defendants before the Tribunal were members of the pro-government media, including the
“hate radio,” RTLM, and the newspaper Kangura. They are not charged with personally participating in
the genocide, but with inciting and directing acts of genocide and crimes against humanity. Their specific
acts range from making statements that promoted ethnic divisiveness to directing attacks against specific
individuals and places. We anticipate that part of the defense will be based on the right of the defendants to
freedom of expression.” Id. Thus, the scope of this paper focuses on the three defendants currently under
indictment at the Tribunal, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, former Director of Political Affairs and senior
member of administration of RTLM, Ferdinand Nahimana, former Director of RTLM and Hassan Ngeze,
former Chief Editor of Kangura newspaper [hereinafter Defendants]. International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Status of ICTR Detainees (9 November 2000). The Defendants’ cases have been joined by the
Trial Chamber. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No: ICTR-97-19-I, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion
for Joinder, 6 June 2000.
2

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 2(2)(c) and Art. 3(h), S/RES/955 (1994) (Annex), 8
November 1994, cited in 2 Virginia Morris and Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda 3-4 (1998) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 1].
3

An exhaustive list of sources is impossible, but the following works have contributed greatly to this
discussion and form the foundation for the analysis in this memorandum: Elizabeth F. Defeis, Freedom of
Speech and International Norms: A Response to Hate Speech, 29 STAN. J. INT’L L. 57 (1992); Sionaidh
Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of the American and European
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and most states parties to these conventions have implementing domestic legislation that
restrict hate speech and racial propaganda.
An examination of how several countries use their hate speech and racial
propaganda legislation demonstrates that the concept of freedom of expression is not a
legitimate defense for crimes of racial hatred and incitement to discrimination or
violence. This memorandum examines restrictions on freedom of expression under
international law and under the domestic laws of the United Kingdom, Germany, Nigeria,
and the United States. This examination demonstrates that prosecutions of direct and
public incitement to commit genocide and persecutions on political, racial and religious
grounds as a crime against humanity may not be limited by claims of the defense of
freedom of expression. The United States is unique among all other nations in its
extreme emphasis on the protection of freedom of expression, but even under US
concepts of freedom of expression, the prosecution of direct and public incitement to
commit genocide and persecutions of political, racial and religious grounds as a crime
against humanity may succeed.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is currently prosecuting three
defendants, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Ferdinand Nahimana and Hassan Ngeze, (“the

Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305 (1999); LOUIS GREENSPAN AND CYRIL LEVITT, EDS., UNDER
THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND RACIAL INCITEMENT IN SIX COUNTRIES (1993);
Michael A.G. Korengold, Note, Lessons in Confronting Racist Speech: Good Intentions, Bad Results, and
Article 4(a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 77 MINN. L. REV.
(1993); Friedrich Kübler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech?: Transnational Aspects of a Conflict of
Human Rights, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 335 (1998); THOMAS DAVID JONES, HUMAN RIGHTS: GROUP
DEFAMATION, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE LAW OF NATIONS (1998); Marian Nash Leich,
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. (1985).
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Rwandan Defendants”) for the crimes of direct and public incitement to commit genocide
and crimes against humanity committed during the 1994 campaign of genocide in
Rwanda.4

The Rwandan Defendants were media principles who started a campaign of

hatred against the Tutsi people that incited and instigated the mass killings of hundreds of
thousands of Tutsis.5 Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, the former Director of Political Affairs
and Ferdinand Nahimana, with others, established the Radio des Mille Collines
(“RTLM”), a radio station dedicated to advancing the cause of Hutu extremists, with
Nahimana becoming the Director of the station.6 Hassan Ngeze was the Editor-in-Chief
of Kangura newspaper which published materials inciting hatred and violence against the
Tutsi and certain Hutus.7 Ngeze also made broadcasts over RTLM inciting hatred and
violence against the Tutsi.8

III. LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO RESTRICTING HATE SPEECH
AND RACIAL PROPAGANDA
1. International Conventions

4

Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No: ICTR-97-19-I, Amended Indictment, 18 December 1998;
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No: ICTR-96-11-T, Amended Indictment, 30 August 1999; Prosecutor v.
Ngeze, Case No: ICTR-97-27-1, Indictment, 6 October 1997.

5

See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA 55-56 (1998). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
6

Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza and Prosecutor v. Nahimana, supra note 4.

7

1 Morris and Scharf, supra note 5 at 56 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20];
Prosecutor v. Ngeze, supra note 4.
8

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 20].

3

The foundation of the statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
is the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(“Genocide Convention”).9 The drafting history of the Genocide Convention clearly
indicates that the concept of freedom of expression was duly considered in the
construction of the section of Article III dealing with direct and public incitement to
commit genocide.10 The United States was opposed to including incitement as an
inchoate offense, not surprisingly because of its strong judicial and political commitment
to freedom of expression, and argued that criminalization of incitement might endanger
freedom of the press.11 The final instrument defines direct and public incitement to
commit genocide as an inchoate crime, so that the prosecution need not prove the
incitement resulted in genocide.12
Although criminalizing incitement to commit genocide affects freedom of
expression, the elements of the crime are crafted in such a way as to preclude any defense
of freedom of expression. The prosecution must show that direct and public incitement
took place, that the direct and public incitement was intentional, and that it was carried
out with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a protected group as such.13 Although

9

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948),
reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER AND PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS
426 (1999-2000 edition) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 4].
10

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 266-271 (2000)
[hereinafter Schabas, GENOCIDE]. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].
11

Id. at 267-268. Several countries (the United Kingdom, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and
Belgium) indicated some support for the United States’ position, and other countries, while supporting the
incitement provision in principle, were concerned about the scope of the text in the earlier drafts. Id. at
269. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

12

Id. at 266. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

13

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

4

the United States abstained from the vote to adopt Article III because incitement was
included,14 and the U.S. ratified the Genocide Convention subject to a reservation that
“nothing in the Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the [U.S.]
prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States,”15
in fact, the U.S. ultimately recognized that the right of freedom of expression would not
be affected by the Genocide Convention.16 In 1970, then Assistant Attorney General
William H. Rehnquist testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on this
issue:
Senator CHURCH. In other words, you are satisfied that such
constitutional protection, as presently exists in the field of free speech,
would not be adversely affected in any way by the terms of this
convention?
Mr. REHNQUIST. I am satisfied, first, that they would not be and,
second, that they could not be.17
Since the United States, with its strong judicial and political commitment
to freedom of expression does not see a conflict between prosecutions for direct
and public incitement to commit genocide under the Genocide Convention, and
since the text of the ICTR statute dealing with genocide is exactly the same as the

14

Id at 270. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

15

U.S. Reservations and Understandings to the Genocide Convention, 28 I.L.M 782 (1989), reprinted in
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 9 at 429. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 8].

16

See Defeis, supra note 3 at 92-93; Leich, supra note 3 at 121. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tabs 12 and 16, respectively].

17

Leich, supra note 3 at 121. In addition to Mr. Rehnquist’s approval, a witness for the American Civil
Liberties Union testified, “…if this convention did interfere with the first amendment, the American Civil
Liberties Union would be the first one to be complaining, without regard to whether or not we commend
the objectives of the convention. However, we do not think there is any problem under the first amendment
to the Constitution.” Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 16].

5

text of the Genocide Convention,18 the ICTR Prosecutor should be able to make
the case for direct and public incitement to commit genocide without being forced
to answer a defense of freedom of expression.
The Genocide Convention is not the only international document that speaks to
the concept of freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is a fundamental right
recognized in several other international instruments, most notably the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights19 (“Human Rights Declaration”) and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights20 (“Civil and Political Rights Covenant”).
Regional conventions, such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,21 the American Convention on Human Rights,22 and

18

See ICTR Statute, supra note 2 at 3; Genocide Convention, supra note 9 at 427. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 4].

19

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. G.A. Res. 217 (III 1948), reprinted in CARTER &
TRIMBLE, supra note 9 at 388 [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. Article 19 of the Declaration states,
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.” Id. at 391. Rwanda is a party to this convention. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 9].
20

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966), reprinted in CARTER &
TRIMBLE, supra note 9 at 394 [hereinafter Civil and Political Rights Covenant]. Article 19(2) states,
“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” Id. at 401. Rwanda is a party to this convention.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 7].
21

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 312 U.N.T.S.
221, E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45, Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55, Protocol No. 8, E.T.S.
118 and Protocol No. 11, E.T.S. 155, reprinted in CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 9 at 472. Article 10(1)
states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers…” Id. at 476. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 5].
22

American Convention on Human Rights, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), reprinted in CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra
note 9 at 489. Article 13(1) is essentially the same as Art. 19(2) of the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights (supra note 9), Id. at 494. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 3].

6

the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights23 (“African Charter”), also recognize
the fundamental right of freedom of expression.
However, these international conventions also recognize that freedom of
expression is not an absolute right. Several of the conventions recognize that rights are
interdependent and cannot be construed as to allow the interference with other rights.24
The Human Rights Declaration declares that the rights and freedoms in the Declaration
“may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.”25 Similarly, the Civil and Political Rights Covenant states that the right of
freedom of expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities and may be
restricted “for the respect of the rights or reputations of others” or for “the protection of
national security or of public order (ordre public) or of public health or morals.26 The
African Charter goes even farther than these two conventions in recognizing the
interdependence of rights; the Preamble to the Charter states that “the enjoyment of rights
and freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone” and the
Charter lists fundamental duties of individuals “towards his family and society, the State
and other legally recognized communities and the international community.”27

23

African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 21 I.L.M. 59 (1981), reprinted in CARTER & TRIMBLE,
supra note 9 at 510 [hereinafter African Charter]. Article 9 states, “(1) Every individual shall have the
right to receive information. (2) Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his
opinions within the law.” Id. at 512. Rwanda is a party to this charter. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 2].
24

See Defeis, supra note 3 at 71. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

25

Art. 29, Universal Declaration, supra note 19 at 392. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab
9].

26

Art. 19(3), Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 20 at 401. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 7].

27

Art. 27, African Charter, supra note 23 at 516. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

7

Individuals also have the obligation to exercise their rights and freedoms with “due
regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.”28
Several international conventions, in addition to recognizing the interdependence
of rights and freedoms and affirming the value of freedom of expression, also have
provisions that expressly restrict freedom of expression in the cases of hate speech and
racial propaganda. The Civil and Political Rights Covenant and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“Racial Discrimination
Convention”), both of which Rwanda is party to, are two conventions in which such
provisions are clearly stated.
Article 20 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant states: “[a]ny advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
or violence shall be prohibited by law.”29 This article was controversial among states
members drafting the Covenant, and several states entered reservations or declarations to
this article upon ratification.30 However, the article was adopted and the Human Rights
Committee has upheld restrictions on freedom of expression in several cases before it,
essentially holding that the freedom of expression right guaranteed by Article 1931 is
compatible with the restrictions outlined in Article 20.32

28

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 2].

29

Civil and Political Rights Covenant, supra note 20 at 401. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tab 7].

30

Defeis, supra note 3 at 79-81. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12]. Rwanda was not
one of these states. 1 United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as
at 31 December 1999 133.

31

See Civil and Political Rights Covenant supra note 20. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 7].

32

Defeis, supra note 3 at 83. In M.A. v. Italy, the Committee ruled inadmissible a complaint that a
conviction for reorganizing the dissolved Fascist Party in violation of Italian law violated freedom of

8

Article 4 of the Racial Discrimination Convention is much more comprehensive
in regards to racist speech and propaganda than Article 20 of the Civil and Political
Rights Covenant and attempts to balance restrictions on speech with the right of freedom
of expression.33 The article states:
States Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are
based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of
persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or
promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to
adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all
incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due
regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this
Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial
discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts
against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin,
and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including
the financing thereof;
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also
organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and
incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize participation in such
organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions,
national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.34
Article 4 was also very controversial among states members drafting the
Convention. One of the delegates in the General Assembly stated that the Article “was

expression and association rights protected by the Civil and Political Rights Convention. The Committee
stated that the acts punished were of a kind which are removed from the protection of the Convention by
Article 5 and were justifiably prohibited by Italian law. Id. In F.R.T. and the W.G. Party v. Canada, the
Committee rejected the petitioners’ contention that Canada had violated their right to freedom of
expression, and stated that the petitioners’ ‘right’ to communicate racist ideas was not only not protected by
the Convention, but actually incompatible with its provisions, and Canada has an obligation under the
Convention to prohibit their actions. Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].
33

Id. at 86; Jones, supra note 3 at 145-146. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tabs 12 and 19,
respectively].
34

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, reprinted in
CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 9 at 431 [hereinafter Racial Discrimination Convention]. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook at Tab 6].

9

the outcome of a difficult compromise after hours, and even days, of discussion, drafting
and redrafting.”35 The Racial Discrimination Convention went farther than the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant in not only prohibiting incitement to racial discrimination, but
also the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred.36 Many critics of the
Racial Discrimination Convention criticize Article 4 because the dissemination provision
focuses solely the speaker’s dissemination of ideas and, as Colombia’s delegate stated,
“punishing ideas…is to aid and abet tyranny, and leads to abuse of power.”37
However, Article 4 itself contains protection for the right to freedom of
expression. Legislation to implement Article 4 is to be taken “with due regard to the
principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights
expressly set forth in Article 5 of this Convention.”38 The right to freedom of expression
is one of the rights expressly set for in Article 5 of the Convention.39 Article 4 of the
Convention only conflicts with the concept of freedom of expression if one adopts an
absolutist approach to freedom of speech, protecting all utterances, even those that are
libel or slander.40 Even the United States, with its strong commitment to freedom of
speech, rejects an absolutist approach, recognizing that some forms of speech are

35

Defeis, supra note 3 at 87. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

36

Id. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 12].

37

Defeis, supra note 3 at 87; Korengold, supra note 3 at 723. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
at Tabs 12 and 14, respectively].

38

Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 34 at 433. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at
Tab 6].

39

Id. at 434. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 6].

40

Jones, supra note 3 at 146. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19].
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unprotected, and even some protected speech may be justifiably restricted to further
compelling state interests.41
The existence of provisions in several international conventions that restrict
freedom of expression clearly indicate that the concept is not an absolute right. Although
the international community recognizes the importance of freedom of expression, it has
also recognized the equal and complementary importance of restricting hate speech and
racial propaganda in the furtherance of the goal of racial equality and nondiscrimination.
This goal can be fairly characterized as jus cogens, a peremptory norm of international
law.42 The Defendants in the Rwanda genocide were involved in the broadcasting and
publishing of racist hate speech and statements that constituted incitement to racial
discrimination and violence.43 They should not be allowed to justify their violations of
international law by claiming their right to freedom of expression.

2. Judicial Interpretations
The Nuremberg Tribunal gives precedent for convictions of persons who commit
incitement to commit genocide and persecution on political, racial and religious grounds
as a crime against humanity. The Tribunal convicted Julius Streicher, the publisher of
Der Sturmer newspaper of persecution on political and racial grounds as a crime against
41

Id. at 148. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19]. A more detailed discussion of the
United States’ concept of freedom of expression is set out below, infra pp. 24-33 and accompanying notes.

42

Id. at 148. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 19].

43

The Kangura newspaper was the most well-known example of government-sponsored hate propaganda.
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Indictment, supra note 4 at para. 1.19. The newspaper published the “Hutu
Ten Commandments,” which not only denigrated and persecuted Tutsi women but called on all the Hutu to
hate and despise the Tutsi population. Id. Broadcasts over RTLM promoted ethnic hatred and incited
ethnic violence. Id. at para. 1.22. The broadcasts identified individuals by name, indicated the hideouts of

11

humanity.44 Streicher’s newspaper was filled with anti-Semitic propaganda and incited
the German people to active persecution of the Jews.45 The broadcasts of the RTLM
were similar to Streicher’s publications in their extreme racial propaganda and incitement
to violence against the Tutsi. The RTLM named individual Hutus and Tutsis opposed to
the President and described them as “enemies” or “traitors” who deserved death.46 Other
RTLM broadcasts declared, “the graves are not yet quite full. Who is going to do the
good work and help us fill them completely.”47
Another Nazi defendant, Hans Fritzsche, a radio commentator and member of the
Propaganda Ministry, was prosecuted in the Tribunal for the same crimes as Streicher.48
He was ultimately acquitted because of the absence of sufficient evidence of the
necessary intent to incite criminal conduct.49 The Tribunal stated:
It appears the Fritzsche sometimes made strong statements of a
propagandistic nature in his broadcasts. But the Tribunal is not
prepared to hold that they were intended to incite the German people
to commit atrocities on conquered peoples, and he cannot be held to
have been a participant in the crimes charged. His aim was rather to
targeted citizens, described the entire Tutsi population as the enemy and called on the Hutus to exterminate
the Tutsi. Id.
44
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arouse popular sentiment in support of Hitler and the German war
effort.50
The Tribunal also found that Fritzsche had no control over the formation of Nazi
propaganda policies and was merely a conduit to the press of the instructions given to
him by the Third Reich Press Chief Deitrich.51 In contrast, the Rwandan Defendants had
authority and control over the content of the radio broadcasts and the material published
in the newspaper.52 In addition, Defendants Nahimana and Barayagwiza created the
RTLM for the purpose of advancing the cause of Hutu extremism.53 The Kangura
newspaper celebrated the creation of RTLM as an instrument in the defense of the Hutu
and a partner in the struggle to defend the Hutu majority.54 Clearly, the Nuremberg
precedent supports the prosecution of the Rwandan Defendants for crimes related to
incitement.
A case concerning direct and public incitement to commit genocide in Rwanda
was heard in Canadian judicial system in 1998.55 In Mugesera v. Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration, the Appeals Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board confirmed
a prior ruling that Rwandan national Leon Mugesera had violated Article II(c) of the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, by committing
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direct and public incitement to genocide.56 Mugesera, an extremist pamphleteer who
gave an infamous speech in 1992 calling for the extermination of the Tutsi, had fled
Rwanda for Canada after that incident and obtained permanent resident status there.57
His speech fell outside the temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR because it occurred well
before 1 January 1994, but under Canadian law he could be stripped of his resident status
if it could be established that he had committed crimes against humanity or war crimes.58
In the first ruling, by sole adjudicator Pierre Turmel (which was upheld by the Appeals
Division), Turmel found that:
Mr. Mugesera made a speech which incited people to drive out and
to murder the Tutsi. It is also established that murders of Tutsis were
in fact committed, and on the basis of probabilities, resulted from the
call for murder thrown out by Mr. Mugesera in his speech. The Tutsi,
beyond a shadow of a doubt, form an identifiable group of persons.
They constituted an identified group and they were a systematic and
widespread target of the crime of murder.
The counseling or invitation thus issued to his audience establishes
personal participation in the offence. In addition, I find that this
participation was conscious, having regard to Mr. Mugesera’s social
standing and privileged position. Mr. Mugesera’s writings and
statements clearly attest to the conscious nature of this participation. I
would add that this counselling was consistent with the policy
advocated by the MRND [the political party of former president
Habyarimana, of which Mugesera was a member], as established by
the evidence.59
Although direct and public incitement to commit genocide under Article III(c) of
the Genocide Convention does not require a showing that the genocide actually took

56

William A. Schabas, International Decision: Mugesera v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 93
AM. J. INT’L LAW 529, 530 (1999) [hereinafter Schabas, Mugesera v. Minister]. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 17].

57

Id. at 529. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 17].

58

Schabas, GENOCIDE, supra note 10 at 273. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

59

Id. at 274. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook at Tab 22].

14

place, the massacres that occurred subsequent to Mugesera’s speech were relevant in
proving that the speech constituted genuine incitement and was not, as Mugesera
claimed, a harmless political diatribe.60 This decision in the Canadian judicial system
relating to a crime under international law may be instructive to the Rwanda Tribunal.61
If the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board did not even consider Mugesera’s claim
of a “harmless political diatribe” as involving a defense of freedom of expression, the
ICTR may similarly decline to consider the Defendants’ claims of freedom of expression
a legitimate defense to the charges against them.

B. DOMESTIC APPROACHES TO RESTRICTING HATE SPEECH AND
RACIAL PROPAGANDA
As discussed above, freedom of expression is an internationally recognized right.
Most countries have codified this right in their domestic constitutions or similar state
laws. However, freedom of expression is not an absolute right, and restrictions on
expression exist in every country, albeit to varying degree. This section analyzes the
restrictions placed on speech in Germany, the United Kingdom, Nigeria and the United
States, and demonstrates why, under each of these systems, the concept of freedom of
expression would not be a legitimate defense for the Rwandan Defendants.62
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1. Germany
Freedom of expression is an essential feature in the German Constitution.63
However, the Constitution also states clearly that freedom of expression is not an
absolute right.64 The freedom of expression provisions in the Constitution interact with
measures in the German Criminal Code designed to prohibit hate speech and racial
propaganda. Section 130 of the Criminal Code states:
(1) Whoever, in a manner liable to disturb the public peace,
(a) incites hatred against parts of the population or invites violence
or arbitrary acts against them, or
(b) attacks the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously
degrading or defaming parts of the population shall be punished by
imprisonment of no less than three months and not exceeding five
years.
(2) Imprisonment, not exceeding five years, or fine will be the
punishment for whoever
(a) distributes,
(b) makes available to the public,
(c) makes available to persons of less than 18 years, or
(d) produces, stores or offers for use as mentioned in letters (a) to
(c) documents inciting hatred against part of the population or
against groups determined by nationality, race, religion, or ethnic
origin, or inviting to violent or arbitrary acts against these parts or
groups, or attacking the human dignity of others by insulting,
maliciously ridiculing or defaming parts of the population or such
a group or
(e) distributes a message of the kind described in (1) by broadcast.
(3) Imprisonment, not exceeding five years or fine, will be the
punishment for whoever, in public or in an assembly, approves, denies
or minimizes an act described in section 220a paragraph 1 committed
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Douglas-Scott, supra note 3 at 321. Article 5(1) of the German Basic Law states, “Everyone shall have
the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by speech, writing and pictures and freely to inform
himself from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of
broadcasting and films are guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.” Id. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
64

Id. Article 5(2) states, “These rights are limited by the provision of the general laws, the provisions of
law for the protection of youth, and the right to inviolability of personal dignity.” Id. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook at Tab 13].

16

under the regime of National-socialism, in a manner which is liable to
disturb the public peace.65
The basic rule of paragraph (1) prohibits racist speech with the requirement of a
threat to public peace, but without also requiring an attack on human dignity.66 Upon the
introduction of the original legislation in the Bundestag, the Justice Ministry defined an
attack on human dignity as an attack “’on the core area of [the victim’s] personality,’ a
denial of the victim’s ‘right to life as an equal in the community,’” or treatment of the
victim as “an inferior being excluded from the protection of the constitution.”67
Paragraph (2) punishes the production and distribution of racist materials by print or
through the media, without the requirements of an attack on human dignity or a threat to
public peace.68 Paragraph (3) prohibits the denial, approval or minimization of the
Holocaust, and includes the requirement of a threat to public peace.69
Germany also has legislation that regulates public and private broadcasting; this
field of law is exclusively legislated by the states, although the basic principles are
established in a “Broadcasting Interstate Agreement” formed in 1991 and amended in
1996 by accord of all the states.70 The agreement prohibits programs
which incite hatred against parts of the population or against a group
which is determined by nationality, race, religion, or ethnic origin, or
which propagate violence and discrimination against such parts or
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groups, or which attack the human dignity of others by insulting,
maliciously ridiculing or defaming parts of the population.71
Without a doubt, Germany’s strict regulation of hate speech and racial
propaganda is informed by the country’s Nazi history, and by the resurgence of Neo-Nazi
activities that occurred in the post cold-war period.72 One might argue that Rwanda’s
history of ethnic tension and conflict, going back well before the 1994 genocide,73 calls
for a similar commitment to laws restricting hate speech and racial propaganda in
Rwanda. In any case, considering this history of ethnic conflict, the ICTR may well be
justified in adopting a perspective on the necessity and value of restrictions on hate
speech and racial propaganda similar to Germany’s perspective, instead of a perspective
more protective of free speech.

2. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, hate speech and racial propaganda is controlled by §§ 1728 of the Public Order Act of 1986, which criminalizes acts intended to or likely to stir up
“racial hatred.”74 Section 17 defines racial hatred as “hatred against a group of persons in
Great Britain defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or
ethnic or national origin.”75 Section 18 criminalizes the use of “threatening, abusive, or
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insulting words or behaviour” that are racially derogatory.76 This section prohibits the
display of written material that is “threatening, abusive or insulting” and that is intended
or likely to stir up racial hatred.77 Section 19 prohibits the publishing or distributing of
the same kind of written material described in §18.78 Section 20 prohibits the direction or
public performance of a play that involves threatening, abusive or insulting words, if the
play is intended or likely to stir up racial hatred.79 Section 21 prohibits the distributing,
showing or playing of a “recording of visual images or sounds” that are intended or likely
to stir up racial hatred and §22 prohibits the broadcast or inclusion in a cable program of
any visual images or sounds mentioned in §21.80 Section 23 prohibits the possession of
material that is threatening, abusive or insulting if the individual possesses it with a view
to displaying, publishing, distributing, broadcasting or showing it, and if the individual
intended to stir up racial hatred or racial hatred was likely to be stirred up by the
individual’s possession of the material.81 The consent of the Attorney General is required
for prosecution under the Act.82
The materials broadcast by the RTLM and published in the Kangura newspaper
by the Defendants would clearly fall within the scope of the prohibitions in Britain’s
Public Order Act. The radio station broadcast messages from the government to the
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people to “go and work” and sent the militia to kill the Tutsis and incite the local people
to kill their Tutsi neighbors.83 The broadcasts also denigrated Tutsi women and called for
acts of hatred and sexual violence against them.84 The material published in the Kangura
newspaper persecuted Tutsis and certain Hutus, and incited the people to kill or cause
serious bodily and mental harm to Tutsis.85
The United Kingdom has actually prosecuted few cases under the Public Order
Act. In 1988, a “soapbox orator” was convicted of making a “racist speech” and
“distributing racist literature.”86 Another defendant was convicted and fined for placing
Neo-Nazi stickers on lampposts.87 In 1990, a member of the Conservative Party in
Cheltenham who described a Black parliamentary candidate as a “Bloody Nigger” was
charged under the Act, but died before trial.88 In 1991, Lady Birdwood was convicted of
distributing anti-Semitic publications, and later that year, three Ku Klux Klan members
were convicted of possessing racially inflammatory materials.89
The fact that few cases have actually been prosecuted under the Act may well be a
positive indication of the co-existence of the concept of freedom of expression and laws
restricting hate speech and racial propaganda. In fact, the UK Attorney General refused
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to grant consent for prosecution in four cases as of October 1995.90 In three of the four
cases, there was insufficient evidence; in the fourth case, the Attorney General concluded
that it would not have been “in the public interest” to prosecute the accused.91 This may
indicate that the Attorney General takes seriously the concept of freedom of expression
and will only commit to prosecuting offenses that fall clearly within the scope of the
Public Act.

3. Nigeria
The organizational structure and substantive content of Nigeria’s Constitution are
patterned on the Constitution of the United States and freedom of expression is one of the
fundamental rights provided for in the Nigerian Constitution.92 However, freedom of
expression is not absolute in Nigeria’s Constitution. Article 43 of the Constitution states,
inter alia:
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(1) Nothing in sections 36, 37, 38, 39, and 40 of this Constitution shall
invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society
(a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public
morality or public health; or
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights of other persons.93
Chapter 10 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria constitutes the implementing
legislation which brought the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights into force
on the domestic level.94 Although there are no laws specifically proscribing group
defamation or incitement to racial hatred, Chapter 7 of the federal Criminal Code Act of
Nigeria does contain restrictions on freedom of expression in Nigeria by prohibiting
“[s]edition and the [i]mportation of [s]editious or undesirable [p]ublications.95 The
relevant portions of the sedition law state:
50. (1)(b) …”seditious publication” means a publication having a
seditious intention; “seditious words” means words having a seditious
intention.
(2) A “seditious intention” is an intention…
(c) to raise discontent or disaffection amongst the citizens or
other inhabitants of Nigeria; or
(d) to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different
classes of the population of Nigeria.
*****
(3) In determining whether the intention with which any act was
done, any words were spoken, or any document was published,
was or was not seditious, every person shall be deemed to intend
the consequences which would naturally follow from his conduct
at the time and under the circumstances in which he so conducted
himself.
51. (1) Any person who –
(a) does or attempts to do, or makes any preparation to do, or
conspires with any person to do, any act with a seditious
intention;
93
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(b) utters any seditious words;
(c) prints, publishes, sells, offers for sale, distributes or
reproduces any seditious publication;
(d) imports any seditious publication, unless he has no reason to
believe that it is seditious;
shall be guilty of an offence and liable on conviction for a first offence
to imprisonment for two years or to a fine of two thousand naira or to
both such imprisonment and fine and for a subsequent offence to
imprisonment for three years and any seditious publication shall be
forfeited to the state.
(2) Any person who without lawful excuse has in his possession
any seditious publication shall be guilty of an offence and liable on
conviction, for a first offence to imprisonment for one year or to a fine
of one hundred naira or both such imprisonment and fine, and for a
subsequent offence to imprisonment for two years; and such
publication shall be forfeited to the state.96
Similar to the United Kingdom Public Order Act, the Nigerian sedition law
requires the consent of the Attorney General of the federation or the state to prosecute an
offence under the Act.97 The prohibitions in the Act against raising discontent or
disaffection among citizens or promoting hostility and ill-will between different classes
of people in Nigeria are broad enough to cover prosecutions against individuals or
organizations that engage in hate speech or racial propaganda that incite hatred or
violence among ethnic or religious groups.98 Nigeria, like Rwanda, has several ethnic
tribes living in the country and Nigeria has a history of ethnic civil wars; the country has
also seen a rise in ethnic tension and conflict since gaining independence from the United
Kingdom in 1960.99
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Professor Oko, an African scholar, endorses the use of the sedition law to stem the
spread of language used to foment discord among ethnic groups:
Section 15(4) of the 1979 Constitution further provides that the State
shall foster a feeling of belonging and of involvement among the
various people of the Federation to the end that loyalty to the Nation
shall override sectional loyalties. Why then should the court declare
unconstitutional an existing law which facilitates the attainment of the
political objectives contained in sections 14(3) and 15(4). Better still,
why should the state not punish anybody who utters or publishes
anything with the intention of promoting ill-will and hostility between
different ethnic or sectional groups of the Federation. It is, in my
view, reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in the interest of
public safety and public order that anyone who publishes anything
with the intention of promoting feelings of ill-will and hostility
between different classes of the population should be punished.100
Nigeria’s experiences with ethnic conflict and the strong potential for the country’s use of
the sedition law to prosecute hate speech and racial propaganda is instructive to case of
the Defendants in Rwanda. The Defendants’ broadcasts and published materials were
clearly intended to promote ill-will and hostility between the Hutus and the Tutsis.101

4. United States
The United States has the strongest concept of freedom of expression of all
countries in the world, and the foundation for the current political and judicial
commitment to freedom of expression is the principle prohibiting “content-based”
regulation of speech.102 In the U.S., there is no federal or uniform legislation that
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restricts hate speech or racial propaganda.103 However, criminal solicitation to commit a
crime is a crime itself: “Whoever commits an offense…or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.104
The First Amendment is not an absolute protection of all speech and some
categories of speech continue to be excluded from protection.105 These categories
include: obscenity;106 “words that are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent;”107 the “fighting words” doctrine;108 and defamation.109
A brief discussion of two important cases dealing with freedom of expression in
U.S constitutional law is important to understand the concept of freedom of expression in
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the U.S. context. These cases are Brandenburg v. Ohio110 and R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul.111
The defendant in Brandenburg, who organized a Ku Klux Klan meeting, made
statements such as, “the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel”
and threatened “revengeance [sic.].”112 He was convicted under an Ohio Criminal
Syndicalism Statute, of “adovact[ing] the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage,
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or
political reform.113 The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional, saying:
the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.114
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the defendant, with a clear intent to intimidate,
placed a burning cross on the lawn of a Black family that had moved into a formerly allwhite neighborhood.115 He was charged under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance, which states, “Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, [or]
object…including…a burning cross…which one knows or has reasonable grounds to
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know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender commits disorderly conduct.”116 The Supreme Court struck the St.
Paul ordinance down as unconstitutional because it “prohibit[ed] …speech solely on the
basis of the subjects the speech address[ed].”117
Some scholars believe that since the St. Paul ordinance that was struck down was
a group libel ordinance, all group libel laws are constitutionally suspect.118 However, a
strong case can be made for the argument that the R.A.V. case did not destroy the ability
of the state or federal government to pass group libel or group defamation laws.119 The
holding of the case applies to fighting words, not to defamation.120 The Supreme Court
struck down the St. Paul ordinance because the ordinance had engaged in selective,
content-based discrimination in proscribing not all “fighting words,” but only those
fighting words that were insulting or inciteful of violence based on race, color, creed,
religion, or gender.121 A suggestion has been made that if the ordinance had been drafted
to proscribe fighting words that have a tendency to create discord and violence, the
ordinance might have passed constitutional muster.122 In any event, it appears reasonable
116
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to believe that carefully drafted group defamation statutes may indeed be constitutional in
the U.S.
Even under the extraordinarily protected concept of freedom of expression in the
U.S., the Rwandan Defendants may not avoid prosecution for incitement to commit
genocide and persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds as a crime against
humanity. The radio broadcasts and newspaper publications put forth by the Defendants
may well fall under one of the exceptions to freedom of expression. Broadcasts like
those that identified individuals by name, indicated the hideouts of targeted citizens and
incited the people to violence against them123 would very likely fall within even the
restrictive concept of “incitement to imminent lawlessness” from the Brandenburg case.
Other inciting statements, like, “The graves are not yet quite full. Who is going to do the
good work and help us fill them completely,”124 and the statements that called for sexual
violence against Tutsi women125 may also qualify as incitement to imminent lawlessness.
Statements that denigrated and persecuted the Tutsi may fall within the “fighting words”
category of exclusions to freedom of expression.
In sum, international law and the domestic legislation of many countries, while
valuing freedom of expression, place varying levels of restrictions on speech that can be
characterized as hate speech or racial propaganda. The ICTR may be justified in
choosing to follow the more restrictive provisions, such as those found in the Racial
Discrimination Convention or in the domestic legislation of Germany. However, even

123

Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Indictment, supra note 4 at para. 1.22, 5.5.

124

Id. at para. 5.4.

125

Id. at para. 5.6.
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under the United States concepts of protection for freedom of expression, the broadcasts
and publications by the Defendants may be beyond protection.
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